Belarusians in Exile: From Administrative Expulsion to Meaningful Participation in Local Democracy
Position Paper and Practical Proposals of VšĮ “Our House Centre for Human Rights and Relief” to the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe | November 2026

Executive Summary: Administrative Displacement of Belarusians and the Need for Pluralist Municipal Policy
Lithuania has received tens of thousands of Belarusians fleeing political repression and the consequences of war. Today, a significant part of this community faces not ordinary difficulties of migration and adaptation but an accumulation of administrative barriers: threats of non-renewal of residence permits, opaque assessments of “threats to national security”, difficulties with family reunification, restrictions on banking services, insufficient protection of children and stigma based on nationality. The result is the effective displacement of Belarusians from Lithuania to other, potentially unsafe states where regularisation is not guaranteed. This is not a benign, voluntary decline in population; it is a crisis of legal security and stability.
We ask the Congress to regard the situation of Belarusians in Lithuania as a test of the practical implementation of PACE Resolution 2499 (2023) and the Luxembourg decisions. Priorities are ending discriminatory practices, ensuring accessible legal defence, and establishing municipal participation mechanisms open to the full spectrum of Belarusian society. Municipalities do not replace migration authorities, but they can secure access to services, support legal protection within their powers and prevent political monopolisation of representation.
I. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS FACING BELARUSIANS IN LITHUANIA
1. Legal insecurity, administrative displacement and onward migration from Lithuania to potentially unsafe countries
According to official figures from Lithuania’s Migration Department, 62,167 Belarusian citizens held valid residence permits on 1 January 2024, 57,511 on 1 January 2025, 50,286 on 1 January 2026 and 47,325 on 1 November 2026. This represents a reduction of 14,842 permits, approximately 23.9%, over the period. Taken together with refusals, cancellations and restrictions on regularisation, these figures call for an investigation of involuntary onward migration and the subsequent fate of people driven first from Belarus and then from Lithuania, rather than a neutral description of “population decline”.
On 1 November 2026, of the 47,325 permits held by Belarusians, 42,643 were temporary and 4,473 permanent; another 128 and 81 respectively were the relevant EU cards. This structure makes tens of thousands of people dependent on repeated administrative decisions. Estimates based on the migration balance indicate approximately 9,885 departures and 5,229 arrivals in 2024. In other words, for every Belarusian arriving in Lithuania in 2024, approximately two left. In our assessment, this points to an extremely toxic and unfriendly environment for Belarusians in Lithuania.
A critical mechanism is the treatment of Belarusian citizenship itself as a practical marker of risk and discrimination. People who fled Lukashenka and do not support the war may face repeated screening on grounds insufficiently disclosed for effective challenge. Non-renewal of documents, loss of employment and income, denial of banking services and risk of family separation reinforce one another. We ask for particular scrutiny of Lithuanian deportation decisions followed by arrests in Belarus, “carousel” detention practices and forced movement from Lithuania to unsafe third countries without a clear route to lawful residence.
The direct link to Resolution 2499 is clear: paragraph 5 calls for Belarusians not to be identified with the Lukashenka regime or discriminated against because of the regime’s participation in the war; paragraphs 6 and 18–20 concern dignified conditions, regularisation tools, long-term status and properly trained migration services; paragraph 21 addresses travel documents and freedom of movement. We request an assessment of Lithuanian practice against these standards.
2. MIPEX 2025: An external assessment of structural weaknesses in integration policy
The independent Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX 2025), published by the Migration Policy Group with researchers from the Diversity Development Group, awarded Lithuania 37 out of 100. Lithuania scored 5/100 for migrants’ political participation, 22/100 for access to nationality, 31/100 for health, and 52/100 each for labour-market mobility and permanent residence. MIPEX assesses migrant integration policies generally, rather than discrimination against Belarusians specifically; its findings describe the structural environment in which Belarusian refugees encounter additional risks.
The score of 5/100 for migrants’ and refugees’ political participation is particularly revealing. The state expects integration while providing almost no systematic opportunities for migrants to influence decisions affecting their lives. Municipal advisory councils involving Belarusian organisations in exile should therefore become a central part of the Congress’s response.
3. Belarusian children in Lithuania: Exclusion from programmes, schooling, disability and psychological support
The problem begins with the invisibility of Belarusian children within assistance systems. The 2023 study “Refugee Children’s Experiences and Wellbeing in Lithuania”, covering 53 children and 86 parents, reported that 97% of the families surveyed were from Ukraine; no Belarusian child was included, despite the presence of tens of thousands of Belarusian citizens in Lithuania at the time. This is a concrete gap in coverage, not a reason to set Ukrainian and Belarusian children against each other.
Belarusian families in Lithuania report school bullying, language-based stigma, enrolment difficulties and shortages of psychologists, speech therapists, classroom assistants and autism specialists. Children who have experienced searches, parental arrest, violence and forced departure are especially vulnerable; exclusion may begin as early as the first year of school. Children with temporary status or incomplete documents are at particular risk of losing access to rehabilitation, continuous therapy and comprehensible support procedures. Each category of benefit and medical service for Belarusian children should be examined rather than assuming that identical rules apply regardless of status.
We ask the Congress to seek municipal scrutiny of complaints of discrimination based on citizenship and language, public data on school bullying, individual support plans for children with disabilities, interpretation services and independent appeals against refusals in Lithuania and other EU countries. Relevant standards include non-discrimination and the best interests of the child under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and inclusive education under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
4. Financial exclusion of Belarusians in exile and effective deprivation of access to their money
Blocking personal and organisational accounts, preventing transfers, denying online banking or access to balances is not an abstract “financial difficulty”: it directly obstructs the payment of rent, medical care, child support and the work of human-rights organisations. In one documented complaint, restrictions affected personal funds, including pension and child-related payments, as well as organisational accounts; access to accumulated funds remained restricted for a prolonged period. Individual cases require confidential examination, but the blocking of bank accounts of Belarusian political refugees with different forms of legal status warrants specific attention by the Congress.
Paragraph 40 of Resolution 2499 expressly calls on banks to distinguish the Lukashenka regime from people who fled it and to undertake appropriate individual customer assessments. Paragraph 42 addresses access to credit, auditing and economic activity. We ask for municipal referral channels to financial supervisors, legal assistance and continuity safeguards for essential payments.
5. Deportation threats facing conscientious objectors and young Belarusian men
Young Belarusian men who refuse militarisation and participation in war face persecution at home while risking refusal of regularisation abroad. Compulsory service in Belarus applies to men aged 18–27; alternative civilian service is available to a restricted group and lasts considerably longer than military service. For example, of 20,000 conscripts as of 1 March 2024, only 75 were authorised to undertake alternative service. Belarusian conscientious objectors must not automatically be treated as security threats merely because of their sex, age or passport.
Applications for protection must be examined individually, taking account of convictions, persecution risks and the principle of non-refoulement. Applicants need legal aid for appeals and safe access to educational and municipal programmes. The nonviolent civic stance of these young people is a resource for future democratic self-government. In Lithuania today, according to our assessment, genuine individual consideration is lacking: refusals appear copied from case to case, sometimes with factual errors and the same arguments mechanically repeated in asylum or residence decisions.
6. Transnational repression and the exclusion of independent Belarusian voices from representation in exile
Belarusians in exile remain vulnerable to surveillance, pressure on relatives, exposure of personal data and smear campaigns. An additional institutional problem arises when European authorities treat Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s office as the sole channel to Belarusian society. Tsikhanouskaya and associated structures are only some of the participants in the Belarusian democratic movement and have no exclusive mandate to represent all Belarusian refugees, independent organisations or the diaspora. Human-rights, women’s, youth, cultural, anti-war, professional and local initiatives, including groups with divergent views, must have direct and equal access to municipal consultations and programmes.
Pluralism must be a binding institutional condition rather than an optional invitation to selected organisations, some of which have been implicated in sexual or corruption scandals, including, in the assessment presented by Our House, the Tsikhanouskaya-affiliated foundations BYSOL and BYHELP. Municipal councils must include Belarusian groups that do not cooperate with one another or openly disagree about political leaders. Access to assistance, premises, grants and municipal policy discussions cannot depend on support for Tsikhanouskaya’s office or any other political structure. Otherwise serious risks of corruption and opacity arise, undermining exiles’ trust in structures operating in exile. Existing “one-stop shop” initiatives should not be assumed to represent the whole diaspora without independent evaluation of access and coverage; a neutral municipal model is needed.
The fundamental principle underlying all proposals is that municipal programmes must work with the full spectrum of Belarusian democratic society, not only Tsikhanouskaya’s office. Political representation of one movement must not be substituted for representation of all Belarusian residents in exile. This applies to councils, one-stop shops, grants, legal assistance, youth programmes and tripartite partnerships.
7. Why the legal insecurity of Belarusians affects European security
Precarious status for activists, independent journalists and conscientious objectors can drive onward migration without any guarantee of regularisation, eliminate sources of information about repression and militarisation, increase vulnerability to pressure from Belarus and erode trust in European institutions. Individual security screening is necessary, but citizenship itself must not replace an assessment of a person’s actual conduct. Protection against arbitrary decisions and meaningful judicial review are part of democratic resilience, not an alternative to security.
- Protecting Belarusian activists who report corruption in host countries
A distinct problem concerns Belarusian human-rights defenders and civic activists in exile who publicly report suspected corruption, abuse, discrimination or unlawful conduct by host-state authorities, including municipal officials. Our House is aware of cases in which Belarusian activists, following such work, faced designation as threats to national security, loss of lawful status or deportation. The Congress should examine these cases separately: a person exposing possible corruption must not face removal because of their human-rights and anti-corruption activity.
The right of Belarusian refugees to criticise municipal and state authorities, submit complaints, provide information to journalists and oversight bodies, testify about corruption and seek judicial scrutiny must be protected in practice. Public criticism, reporting to anti-corruption agencies or participation in civic campaigns cannot, in themselves, justify designation as a national-security threat. Where migration measures follow, their possible connection with previous disclosures must be examined, retaliation prevented and independent review with a genuine opportunity to challenge the decision ensured.
We propose confidential corruption-reporting channels accessible to Belarusian activists regardless of nationality or migration status; independent examination of potential official retaliation; urgent funding for lawyers and interpreters where deportation is threatened; access to the material needed for defence; safe referral to competent anti-corruption and human-rights bodies; and dedicated monitoring when a person is denied renewal of documents or labelled a national-security threat after reporting corruption. Municipal institutions must not refer a complaint for consideration to the official whose conduct is challenged.
II. POLITICAL PLURALISM AND ANTI-CORRUPTION SAFEGUARDS
The damaging consequences of six years of exclusive political intermediation: making the problems of Belarusians in exile invisible
In Our House’s assessment, the predominant engagement of European institutions with one Belarusian political centre over the last six years has had damaging consequences not only for representation but also for practical rights protection. Many active diaspora organisations—including independent human-rights, women’s, humanitarian, youth and anti-war initiatives—have lacked comparable access to systematic consultation and agenda-setting. This should be examined through an open review of consultation participants, working groups and beneficiaries of support.
The issue is not simply that some organisations were not invited to meetings. When institutions learn about community needs chiefly through a privileged political channel, administrative displacement, deportation threats, banking exclusion, the cost of legal defence, the situation of children with disabilities or trauma, and risks facing conscientious objectors and independent defenders can fall outside institutional attention. In Our House’s assessment, many of these problems have received no adequate response over six years and have significantly worsened. The Congress should examine not just who was represented, but which concrete problems were omitted from assistance programmes and how the situation of affected people changed.
Monopolising access to consultations risks making human-rights violations systematically invisible. Representation of one political movement must not be equated with representation of all Belarusian residents, especially when public resources and assistance priorities are at stake. Neither Tsikhanouskaya’s office nor any other structure should have exclusive authority to decide which organisations may participate, which problems deserve attention or who receives support.
We ask the Congress to recommend mandatory direct consultations with a broad range of independent Belarusian organisations, including those critical of existing political centres or of one another. Municipalities should publish selection rules, keep an accessible register of issues raised and give reasoned replies to groups not represented on advisory councils. Success should be judged by accessible protection, inclusion of vulnerable people and actual resolution of problems.
The Congress should recommend independent councils of Belarusian residents attached to municipalities: open applications by organisations and unaffiliated residents; published criteria; representation of diverse and critical groups; limited terms and rotation; public minutes; minority opinions; independent appeals against exclusion; conflict-of-interest declarations; and publication of grant recipients and reasons for decisions, while protecting sensitive data. No political office should unilaterally appoint council members, set agendas or distribute resources.
A one-stop assistance service should be a municipal or competitively selected independent professional service. Access must not depend on membership of a political organisation, public support for a leader or referral by an intermediary. A pluralist council should oversee service quality; confidential legal cases must remain separate and must not be disclosed to political representatives.
Belarusians as the human infrastructure of democratic security
Belarusian refugees are not merely recipients of assistance. Among them are experts in human rights, independent journalism, civic nonviolence, mediation and countering propaganda. European municipalities can support their paid participation in civic councils, nonviolent conflict-resolution programmes, youth media laboratories, civic education and preparation for future democratic local government in Belarus.
III. INTEGRATED PROGRAMME OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND PRACTICAL ACTIONS FROM OUR HOUSE
We propose that the Congress combine its assessment of violations of Belarusians’ rights with a practical municipal action programme. The priority must be tangible improvements in the lives of Belarusians in exile, not the number of formal consultations.
First, investigate administrative displacement and onward migration from Lithuania: request data on permit renewals and cancellations, national-security decisions, asylum refusals, deportations, judicial appeals and consequences for families. Examine the 2024 migration balance—approximately 9,885 departures against 5,229 arrivals, roughly two departures per arrival—and the fate of Belarusians compelled to leave Lithuania.
Review implementation of the Luxembourg decisions by comparing administrative practice with paragraphs 5, 6, 18–21, 40 and 42 of PACE Resolution 2499 (2023), covering non-discrimination, regularisation, documentation, banking services and economic activity. Our House is ready to provide documents and individual cases supporting the discriminatory practices described.
Conduct an open review of consultation membership, working groups and support recipients over the past six years; identify independent Belarusian organisations that were excluded and the problems that consequently remained invisible. Ensure direct consultations with human-rights, women’s, youth, anti-war, cultural, humanitarian and professional initiatives, including critics of Tsikhanouskaya’s office and unaffiliated residents.
Tripartite municipal partnerships
Each pilot should bring together (a) a Belarusian diaspora organisation in Lithuania, (b) a Lithuanian municipality and (c) a municipality in another Council of Europe member state experienced in migrant participation. A joint working group selects a practical challenge—school integration, access to services, resident participation, women’s employment or trauma support—and implements a project with an open budget, timetable and evaluation.
Belarusian participants must have paid roles as coordinators, needs researchers, community mediators and project-board members, rather than merely symbolic status as “beneficiaries”. Municipalities exchange experience, establish lasting inter-city ties and prepare specialists for future decentralisation in democratic Belarus.
Independent councils of Belarusians in exile: mandatory pluralism instead of one representative monopoly
We propose municipal councils of Belarusian residents recruited through open calls, transparent criteria, rotation, public minutes and independent selection. Membership should reflect the community’s real diversity: human-rights and women’s organisations, young people, parents, conscientious objectors, independent journalists, cultural and humanitarian initiatives, small associations and unaffiliated residents. Organisations critical of each other must also be included. Neither Tsikhanouskaya’s office nor any other political structure should appoint participants unilaterally, approve agendas or act as an obligatory intermediary for municipal access.
Councils should be empowered to propose policies on schools, social assistance, employment, security and integration, receive reasoned municipal responses and publish dissenting opinions. Conflict-of-interest rules, minority protection, independent complaints and safe participation without exposing sensitive information are essential. Disagreement among Belarusian organisations or with local political actors is a normal part of democracy, which European cities can help both Lithuania and Belarusians in exile practise.
Belarusian organisations in exile must be free to criticise discriminatory host-state practices and demand solutions without fear of sanctions by local politicians or authorities, or threats of deportation to a Belarusian prison for anti-corruption and human-rights work in the host country—as, in our assessment, has happened in Lithuania.
To protect activists reporting corruption by municipal and national authorities, we propose an independent reporting channel to anti-corruption and human-rights institutions, with confidential registration, legal support and urgent protection against deportation. Whenever an activist is denied regularisation, threatened with removal or declared a national-security threat after public disclosure, there must be an independent examination of the possible connection between their civic activity and the administrative decision. Access to municipal programmes, consultations and funding must not depend on refraining from criticism of local authorities.
Municipal grants, premises and contracts require open criteria, declarations of conflicts of interest, independent committees, published decisions and a comprehensible complaints procedure. No political structure should control council membership or the allocation of support.
3. An independent municipal one-stop shop for Belarusians
The one-stop shop must be a municipal or independently managed service, not a department of a questionable political office. At present no structure in exile possesses sufficient political legitimacy to represent all Belarusians. The service should advise on status, documents, schools, social payments, banking complaints, employment and legal aid. Contractors must be chosen openly on professional merit, under the supervision of a pluralist council of Belarusians in exile. Political loyalty, membership or endorsement by a particular leader must never be required; secure complaints and direct referrals to competent institutions are essential.
Evaluation of the one-stop shop must focus on accessibility, reach across different groups and actual problem resolution, rather than the volume of requests. Applicants’ personal data and legal files must not be handed to political intermediaries.
4. Municipal protection for Belarusian children and families
Establish pilot school-integration teams providing needs assessment at enrolment, accessible interpretation, anti-bullying protocols, family advisers, trauma specialists and support for children with autism and other developmental differences. Independently audit equal access to programmes for Belarusian and other children, without setting communities against one another. Provide crisis support to Belarusian parents and children facing loss of legal status.
5. “Send Peace as a Gift”: first contacts towards reconciliation among Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians
We propose a Europe-wide digital postcard campaign. Over 24 days, each participant receives 24 peace messages from different people and may send messages to others. Artists from different countries create the illustrations; a secure platform protects personal data and moderates messages. Municipalities can provide venues for launches, involve schools and artists, and sponsor gift places for activists facing repression.
Its particular value lies in the possibility of voluntary, safe contact and dialogue among people from Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, and among deeply divided groups within Belarusian society. A postcard cannot replace justice or accountability; no victim is obliged to forgive or communicate with a perpetrator. But voluntary human contact can be a first step in a long reconciliation process among the three nations even before the war ends.
6. “Peace Tour”, “Peace Bouquet”, “Peace Cake” and related initiatives: civic action and women-led social enterprises
“Peace Tour” is a network of city events, meetings and artistic actions involving Belarusian refugees, local residents and European partners. Municipalities can host events, provide spaces, assist with communications and build inter-city links. Beyond symbolic solidarity, the aim is to address mistrust and foster cultural dialogue among three nations in exile: Belarusians, Ukrainians and Russians.
“Peace Bouquet”, “Peace Cake” and related projects offer a social-enterprise model for Belarusian refugee women, including those who struggle to enter the labour market after trauma, relocation or a long career break. The model provides paid jobs, mentoring, training, municipal orders for floral arrangements and gifts for city events, and partnerships with local businesses. Women’s economic independence strengthens communities and creates natural spaces for contact and reconciliation among Belarusians, Ukrainians and Russians in exile.
7. “Prisoners for Peace”: municipal solidarity on 1 December
Every year on 1 December, the international anti-war movement marks Prisoners for Peace Day. Municipalities can organise letter-writing evenings, exhibitions and meetings to tell the stories of Belarusians imprisoned for their anti-war positions and resistance to militarisation and the war in Ukraine.
8. Trauma, historical memory and difficult reconciliation within Belarusian society
Belarusian society is divided by more than political beliefs. Repression has penetrated families, schools, neighbourhoods and professional relationships: a denunciation may have come from an acquaintance, relative or colleague. Reconciliation cannot be reduced to a joint photograph or a populist demand to “forget the past”. Specialists need training in trauma-informed dialogue, methods addressing memory and accountability, confidential support groups and exchanges with Germany and other countries that have experienced authoritarian violence.
Municipalities can fund training for mediators and educators, intergenerational memory laboratories and safe voluntary meetings without equating victims with perpetrators. Work with children and adolescents, including parents and teachers, should be a distinct strand.
9. Conscientious objectors as participants in Belarusian democracy
We propose municipal scholarships, seminars on nonviolent civilian defence, placements on community councils and referral routes for young Belarusians refusing military service. Their experience is valuable in local mediation, social work, civic education and humanitarian projects.
10. A municipal democracy programme for the future of Belarus
Organise year-long practical cycles involving observation of municipal council meetings and elections, participatory budgeting, public hearings, local policy design, anti-corruption procedures and conflict-of-interest management. Participants must come from diverse Belarusian groups rather than a delegation of one political structure. The result will be practical skills, joint projects and professional links available during a future democratic transition.
11. Legal assistance, funding for lawyers and access to the European Court of Human Rights
For Belarusians in exile, the right to defence often exists only on paper. Non-renewal of residence permits, designation as a national-security threat, restricted access to case files or blocked bank funds require immediate professional challenge. Without lawyers, interpreters and resources to pay for proceedings, people are effectively denied an effective remedy. The consequences are particularly severe for families with children, people with medical conditions and young conscientious objectors. This is not charity but meaningful access to justice and the practical application of European values.
We propose a municipally supported mechanism for independent legal aid to Belarusian refugees: initial case assessment; payment of qualified lawyers for administrative and judicial proceedings; document and oral interpretation; challenges to deportation and entry bans; restoration of access to bank accounts, benefits and housing; and representation in cases involving discrimination against children and families. An urgent funding track is essential where appeal deadlines are short.
A separate urgent category concerns Belarusian whistleblowers and human-rights defenders facing retaliation after reporting corruption by local authorities, including refusal to renew residence permits, designation as national-security threats or initiation of deportation. They require immediate independent representation, protection of confidential sources and an opportunity to challenge the motives and grounds of administrative decisions.
Strategic cases before the European Court of Human Rights require a separate component: preparing and lodging applications, funding legal work and translations, conducting correspondence with the Court and supporting implementation of judgments. Municipal grants may support human-rights organisations and independent legal services within national funding rules. Municipalities do not replace courts, decide cases or interfere with lawyers’ independence. Where local budgets cannot fund proceedings, the Congress should recommend an inter-municipal or European legal-defence fund.
The practical model is a framework agreement between a municipality and independent legal NGOs and bar associations, confidential intake, and an independent committee without political representatives of the diaspora, applying transparent criteria of urgency, vulnerability and legal significance. Membership of advisory councils must not be a condition for assistance.
The Luxembourg decisions underscore that protection against arbitrary loss of status and nationality-based discrimination is impossible without accessible appeals. Effective legal defence must accompany recommendations on regularisation and integration. We ask the Congress to include funding for legal representation among the permitted and recommended instruments of local support.
Whistleblower protection must include an independent examination of any connection between disclosure of wrongdoing and a subsequent national-security decision, refusal of regularisation or deportation threat. Secure reporting channels, independent oversight, source confidentiality, urgent judicial review and protection against removal to a country of persecution are essential.
12. Young Belarusian bloggers and journalists: a joint European programme for peaceful communication between youth in exile and inside Belarus
We propose a long-term, municipally supported programme—not a one-off publicity campaign—for young Belarusian bloggers, journalists, podcasters and digital creators. They can speak with young people inside Belarus and in exile about civic security, refusal to participate in war, resistance to militarisation, nonviolent alternatives, human rights, historical memory, collective trauma and reconciliation without collective blame. A particular task is communication among Belarusian, Ukrainian and other European youth audiences without demanding that victims forgive or abandon justice.
European cities can provide venues for educational meetings, exchanges, practical placements and joint media projects, connecting young creators with municipal communications teams, schools, libraries and nonviolent-conflict specialists. Training should include fact-checking, ethical interviewing, digital security, trauma-informed practice, personal-data protection and responses to harassment.
Safe feedback from young people inside Belarus is particularly important. Belarus is currently saturated with military propaganda, while anti-militarist young Belarusians in exile lack channels to communicate with their peers inside the country. Municipal partners can support independent editorial teams, mentoring, translation and distribution in host-community languages. The programme must be open to creators from diverse Belarusian civic and political environments, not merely those connected to Tsikhanouskaya’s representative centre, which, in Our House’s assessment, has used its monopoly over the last six years to impose additional censorship and pressure on independent Belarusian voices.
Practical formats include youth discussions of local democracy, podcasts and short videos on civic nonviolence, interviews with residents of host cities, material on refugee rights and municipal services, historical-memory projects and safe dialogues about war. Reconciliation is voluntary and long-term, grounded in truth, dignity, responsibility and non-repetition.
Success should be assessed by the durability of relationships, quality and safety of communication, diversity of voices and young participants’ ability to work independently after training—not merely publication or view counts. We ask the Congress to include this work in recommendations preparing Belarusians for future local self-government.
13. Access to international protection and urgent assistance for vulnerable Belarusian applicants in exile
A continuous support pathway is needed from the first notification of possible deportation to the final decision: an independent lawyer, interpreter, temporary family support, psychological assistance, safe accommodation and referral to appropriate European mechanisms. Particular priorities include minors, families, women who have survived violence, people with disabilities, human-rights defenders, journalists and conscientious objectors. Assistance must never depend on loyalty to a political centre.
We propose an inter-municipal protocol for urgent case referral and assistance funding, together with legal-expertise exchanges among cities in Lithuania and other Council of Europe states. Such cooperation is especially important when a person must move to another country and restart regularisation, particularly because of discriminatory practices against Belarusians in Lithuania.
Independent monitoring should cover implementation of recommendations, access to legal and social assistance, political diversity of participants, investigation of corruption complaints, possible retaliation against activists and results of municipal pilots. Reports must protect the confidential information of those affected.
IV. A PROPOSED MANDATE FOR THE CONGRESS: FROM REPORTING TO MUNICIPAL ACTION
The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe is uniquely placed to translate European solidarity with Belarusians in exile from declarations into the daily practice of cities. This is not only a matter of refugee protection: European municipalities can become practical schools of democratic self-government for a future Belarus. We propose a dedicated Congress workstream on “Belarusians in Exile and Local Democracy”, linking rights monitoring, protection of independent civil society and practical cooperation between municipalities.
1. Dedicated hearings and direct testimony from affected people
Hold thematic hearings with Belarusian human-rights defenders, independent journalists, conscientious objectors, parents of refugee children, women who have survived violence and activists who have reported corruption by host-state authorities. Invitations must be open to independent organisations, including critics of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s office; no political centre should control the final speaker list. Allow confidential testimony and secure submission of documents. Hearings should produce a public register of issues, responsible institutions and deadlines for follow-up.
2. A municipal protection protocol for activists and whistleblowers
Develop a model protocol for cities hosting Belarusians: independent receipt of corruption and abuse reports; immediate referral to legal counsel; no referral of a complaint to the official whose conduct is challenged; assessment of retaliation risks; confidentiality safeguards; and emergency family assistance. Where an activist is labelled a national-security threat, loses documents or faces deportation after reporting corruption, independent scrutiny of the possible link between these events should be triggered automatically. The Congress should insist that criticism of municipal authorities must never become a mechanism of immigration punishment.
3. A European network of partner cities and three pilot agreements
Establish a voluntary network of municipalities willing to cooperate directly with Belarusian organisations without political gatekeepers. As a first step, conclude at least three tripartite agreements: independent Belarusian organisation, Lithuanian municipality and municipality in another Council of Europe state. Each pilot should have joint governance, paid roles for Belarusian specialists, an open budget, a concrete benefit for residents and a one-year evaluation. Initial themes should include children and families, legal aid, women’s employment and social enterprise, peace education and participation in local government.
4. Emergency legal-defence and strategic-litigation fund
Invite Congress partners to establish an inter-municipal mechanism for urgently funding lawyers, interpreters and court costs. Priorities include deportation, national-security decisions, banking restrictions, family separation and reprisals against whistleblowers. A dedicated track should fund preparation and conduct of strategic cases before the European Court of Human Rights. An independent professional committee should make funding decisions without regard to applicants’ political loyalties.
5. Implementation indicators and an annual public review
Measure results rather than meetings or symbolic events: the number of people who obtain legal counsel before an appeal deadline; discrimination complaints resolved; time taken to address school-integration problems; diversity of independent organisations and unaffiliated residents participating in consultations; cases of possible retaliation referred for independent scrutiny; and paid jobs or placements created. Publish an annual review protecting sensitive personal data and allowing independent organisations to submit dissenting assessments.
6. A municipal-democracy learning laboratory for the future of Belarus
With European cities, launch practical training for Belarusian activists in municipal council work, participatory budgeting, public-procurement ethics, conflicts of interest, local elections, resident participation, management of social infrastructure and nonviolent conflict resolution. Participants should come from different independent organisations and unaffiliated citizens, not a delegation of one political office. The outcome will be trained practitioners and durable municipal links serving host communities and a future democratic Belarus.
7. The concrete decision we request
We ask the Congress to appoint a responsible working group, hold thematic hearings, invite municipalities to establish three pilot partnerships, prepare model standards for pluralist councils and whistleblower protection, and publish a review of results within twelve months. Our House is ready to supply case materials, expert proposals and contacts of independent Belarusian initiatives for direct dialogue.


